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PAUL DRESCH-University of Michigan 
Segmentary lineage theory (or “lineage theory” for short) has had its day in studies of Middle 
Eastern tribalism. Nothing has satisfactorily replaced it. In the present paper I wish to suggest 
that although lineage theory is best discarded, the simpler idea of segmentation which underlay 
it is  less easily dispensed with and remains useful. Lineage theory and segmentation are not at 
all the same thing; indeed, they represent two different types of anthropology. The first deals 
with sequences of events at the level of observation (and in particular with the appearance of 
groups), while the second deals with formal relations that characterize the types of events pos- 
sible. 
The distinction between the two is  seldom made clearly, and the view of many anthropolo- 
gists is  well summarized by Eickelman as follows: 
As an ideology of social relations among many tribal groups in the Middle East, the notion of segmen- 
tation has considerable importance. As a sociological model i t  is  inadequate [Eickelman 1981 :1041. 
The approach being downgraded or limited here is that criticized by Peters (1 967), and to de- 
fine it negatively in this way is really necessary. For all the discussion of it, lineage theory is  
seldom definitively set out and must usually be reconstructed from the attacks of its critics. The 
one clear formulation of what it means to an adherent is  Gellner’s (1969:41-441, a very late 
recension of what he takes Evans-Pritchard to have said 30 years earlier (Evans-Pritchard 1974 
11940j). Nonetheless, adherents and critics agree on the major points. The broad idea is, or 
was, that solidary groups form, and then combine or conflict, in predictable ways within a 
system sustained by a balance of power between its elements.’ Peters (1967:270-272) showed 
that this did not occur among Cyrenaican pastoralists. The demonstration could be repeated 
for other tribal societies. That something like it was supposed to occur might form part of an 
”ideology” (Eickelman 1981 :104). 
The original idea of segmentation (Evans-Pritchard 1974 11 9401) seems quite different from 
this. It does not deal in terms of solidary groups or of a balance of power;2 indeed, such analysis 
of ”social masses and a supposed relation between those masses” was explicitly rejected in the 
hope of establishing “relations between relations” (Evans-Pritchard 1974 [1940]:266). As a 
number of authors have noted, not least of them Dumont (1970:41), this has a much more 
modern ring. For all the worry about segmentation in Middle Eastern contexts i t  might never 
have been written. The argument is still usually, and perversely, about “social masses”-about 
“lineage theory” and not about segmentation at all.’ 
Arguments about segmentation in the Middle Eastern context s t i l l  turn on the pres- 
ence or absence of solidary groups. Yemeni material i s  used to show that this is 
largely irrelevant. Segmentation concerns structural principles that apply to groups 
and individuals alike, to events that “follow the rules“ and to those that contradict 
them, The principles of segmentation underlie a far wider range of events than 
those dealt with by segmentary lineage theory. [Middle East, Yemen, segmenta- 
tion, social structure, forms of action] 
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One of the many results of this confusion is  notorious: two well-known views of Morocco, 
each of which seems “formed on a different planet” from the other (Gilsenan 1982:280). Gell- 
ner (1969) accepts lineage theory, others (for example, Eickelman 1976; Rosen 1979) reject it, 
and neither side finds any sense to segmentation other than that which lineage theory gave it. 
Eickelman (1 984:282-283), for instance, sees Evans-Pritchard and Gellner as simply engaged 
in a single enterprise (as, of course, does Gellner himself). By contrast, I am inclined to treat 
them as being poles apart. Indeed, when Eickelman (1 984:285-286) writes of an “interpretive 
anthropology” that “takes as its point of departure an attempt to delineate the implicit assump- 
tions which people themselves make concerning the nature of the social order,” I would argue 
that this is very much what Evans-Pritchard was attempting in the first place. Gellner was not. 
The reaction to Gellner obscures a connection between aspects of Evans-Pritchard’s work and 
the interpretivists’ stated aims, a connection that needs to be recognized if the interpretive po- 
sition i s  not to appear as extreme as Gellner’s own. 
The reaction, of course, has its own logic. If solidary groups are not to be found, then what 
one can find instead are “dyadic relations” and the “free-play of personality” (see, for example, 
Rosen 1979:20, 35, 39, 40). Social structure i s  then to be based on these in a manner oddly 
reminiscent of an earlier transactionalist rejection of structural functionalism, and an alternative 
(though well-established) view of structure is  passed by.‘ Ties between individuals replace ties 
between groups, but they are still ties of much the same type, just as little abstracted from par- 
ticular cases: the ”social masses” are simply whittled down to persons or actors. 
The problems that have been very ably brought to light in Moroccan ethnography are of 
general relevance. They apply just as much to Yemeni material, for example, and it is  the Ye- 
meni case I shall use to show what I think segmentation amounts to. It should be made clear 
that I am limiting myself to Middle Eastern material. The issue of segmentation has developed 
differently in other areas-for example, New Guinea has benefited from several classic anal- 
yses (for example, Barnes 1962; Meggitt 19651, and for a recent collection of impressive eth- 
nographic breadth the reader can safely be referred to Holy (1 979kbu t  in the Middle Eastern 
context the debate on segmentation has taken a distinctive turn. Elsewhere (Dresch 1984a) I 
have taken issue with Gellner’s view of the matter. Here I discuss only that of an interpretive 
position in which “persons are conceived as the fundamental units of social structure” (Ei- 
ckelman 1984:286). Several other readings deserve mention (for example, Bourdieu 1977; 
Lancaster 1981). But Gellner and the interpretivists represent two poles of what I suspect, for 
slightly different reasons than Combs-Schilling (1 9821, is  a “false dichotomy.” 
Yemeni tribalism and segmentation 
Most of the tribes of Upper Yemen belong to one or the other of two larger sets, Hashid and 
Bakil, which between them constitute a larger set still, named Hamdan. The pair of names is  
pre-Islamic, and for at least a millennium has provided an axis of reported conflict. It i s  now 
said proverbially of two men at serious odds that “there is  between them what there is  between 
Hashid and Bakil.” In practice, relations between men of a tribe from one set and those of a 
tribe from the other may be cordial, hostile, or quite unmarked. The constituent tribes of Hashid 
and Bakil are territorial entities whose extent changes only slowly over time, and the borders 
between tribes are usually closely defined. The geographical extent and the population of these 
tribes, of which about seven are Hashidi and 14 Bakili, both vary from case to case, as they do 
from section to section within one tribe. These variations by themselves should dispel any 
temptation to look for a balance of power; so too should the extreme longevity of the system’s 
major elements5 
The good standing of a tribe (its worth in the eyes of others and its “value” in the system) is  
expressed in terms of sharaf: roughly, ”honor as presented to the outside world.” The name of 
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the tribeor section (that of its “ancestor”) is  the d$ior da<wah, the “summons” that calls men 
to act in defense of their common honor or to enlarge that honor in some common exploit. The 
maintenance of sharaf, or “honor projected,” depends upon the protection of .a@, or “honor 
defended.“ These terms are situated against each other within a simple structure which, for 
those who think diagrammatically, can be sketched as shown in Figure 1 .6 Honor i s  the quality 
par excellence that can only exist in opposition. A tribesman cannot have honor by himself (in 
the Yemeni case he needs someone to defend it from), nor can a tribe or section, and sections 
or tribes have little substance apart from this honor that their members share. The same diagram 
thus applies to each level of the tribal classification, from the individual arms-bearing man up- 
ward. 
Sections are not opposed to the tribes they form part of. They are opposed to other sections, 
just as tribes are opposed to tribes and Hashid to BakiI. The elements of the system acquire their 
value from the structure, without which they are only spaces on the map (a section by itself 
really is like the clap of one hand), and the notion of segmentation simply describes this. 
It happens that in the Yemeni version the protected space on which sharafdepends is often 
identified with physical space: that is, with territory. Borders are thus a marked element, but 
there are others. The honor of a tribe i s  at stake not only in assaults on the borders, but in assaults 
on whatever those borders contain and on members of the tribe or their dependants wherever 
they may be; in breaches of the peace by outsiders in tribal territory, even if the tribe’s members 
are in no way directly involved; in offenses against those whom the tribe protects (for example, 
descendants of the Prophet, certain families of ”judges,” “weak” people such as traders); and 
in offenses against protected events or places (for example, markets and certain towns).7 In any 
of these circumstances the “summons” of the collective name may be invoked. 
A man whose arable land, for instance, i s  violated by outsiders may call on his “brothers” 
in the tribe or section for support. In practice numbers of such men (not by any means all of 
them) will often fight alongside him, although they have no personal interest whatever in his 
farm land or what it produces. Nor do those who turn out in support of the man attacked always 
have any personal link with him such as kinship, property, or a shared commitment to some 
other project. Men act to restore the “inviolability” of their tribe’s territory (hurrnat al-wayan). 
SHARAF SHARAF 
opposition 
protected space protected space 
Figure 1 .  
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That inviolability is  an aspect of the <ard (roughly, “honor as defended”) on which the tribe’s 
good standing rests and in which the .-adof the tribe’s members is in some measure contained. 
We have said nothing about corporate or cohesive groups, nothing yet about individual ac- 
tors or discrete events. We have talked only of (conceptual) structures and of definitions. How- 
ever, i t  might be noted that those structures, informed by balanced or complementary opposi- 
tion, do not “emerge” from interaction or from bargaining. They are not the product of indi- 
vidual actions. As we shall see, individual actions presuppose them. The structures have 
precisely the quality of ext6riorit6 with respect to the individual that anthropology is  used to 
dealing with. Without opposition of formal equivalents there is  no sharaf, without sharaf there 
is no such entity as a section or tribe (or even a tribesman), and without the opposition of such 
elements to each other being brought to consciousness there is, in a segmentary world, no 
“significance” (Meeker 1976, Pt. 1 : 246, 253, 256). Men’s actions would be meaningless or, 
to put the point more exactly, a whole range of actions would no longer be possible. 
There remains a disjunction between what people do and say (the problem of “ideology”), 
but the disjunction itself is  intelligible. Sections or tribes are elements in a structure of collective 
honor, and it is  hardly surprising that hypothetical questions by outsiders (people against 
whom, in the abstract, honor is defended or projected) are answered with a certain uniformity, 
particularly when the terms of the question preempt the answer. If one asks, ”What happens in 
a killing between Hashid and Bakil?” the answer will often come back in the familiar terms of 
cohesion and solidarity. The crux of the matter in practice is  that, for example, a man from A, 
which happens to be in Hashid, killing a man from B, which happens to be in Bakil, i s  not 
necessarily taken up as “a killing between Hashid and Bakil.” Almost anything could happen. 
It is  not that the relevant local concepts are “malleable” (Rosen 1979:46), but that they do not 
specify their own application, and this application is  highly variable. 
It i s  important to note here that, even in the most abstract terms, the segmentary structure of 
shared honor does not imply unfailing cohesion-first, because each lower-order element 
(man, family, section) is  a particular locus of honor, which may be invoked against others at 
the same level and thus preempt an appeal to a higher-order set; and second, because honor 
requires not that one support one’s “brothers” in all circumstances, but that one acts to uphold 
their rights and the rights of the collectivity. The rhetoric invoked i s  of moral equilibrium (mi- 
zan, balance), whereby action is  undertaken purportedly to restore the status quo ante of those 
wronged.” Who is to say in a given case where the right and wrong lie? The possibility exists, 
and in practice is  often exploited, of saying that our people are in the wrong and that honor 
demands we ignore the collective summons or even oppose it. They may then say that we are 
acting dishonorably, but we can claim the same of them. The practical problems that ensue 
may be more or less severe, but there is  no contradiction felt by those who do so in refusing 
support to one’s tribal brothers. 
If a contradiction is to be discerned at all, it affects only the higher-order set whose name is  
invoked unsuccessfully, but this i s  at a level where, as it were, no one lives. A claim to support 
may be made in terms of tribe X: as soon as some group of men says, “We in X,  see things 
differently,” then X, which abstractly denotes both the claimants and those refusing to support 
them, becomes only a word. The power of that word depends on who uses it when and for 
what perceived ends. 
As perhaps in most societies, there is a tendency to hold, without looking too closely at the 
facts of the case, that “our” people are in the right as against outsiders-a spirit of tribal soli- 
darity right or wrong, of the “clannishness,” or cohesive drive against others, called <a?abiyyah. 
No doubt there is a corresponding tendency for events to follow the lines of tribal classification 
(we shall return to what is  meant by this), but it is  only a tendency. In a given case, and from 
the point of view of behavior or of observation, almost anything may happen. From the point 
of view of action or of meaning one seldom escapes the notion of segmentation or the particular 
categories it informs. 
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There is not the space here to do much more than assert that segmentarism in the Yemeni 
case has an oddly inclusive power. Whatever is put into the system emerges looking like trib- 
alism: foreign intervention by Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Britain in the 1960s and by the Saudis, 
South Yemen, Iraq, and Libya and a half-dozen other powers since then; the rise of more local 
political groups; and disputes over day-to-day running of such things as the trucking business 
have all acquired segmentary form (Dresch 1984b:171-172). 
To be clear about what is  meant by this let us go back to the locus classicus. Segmentation 
is apparent first of all in a process of (situational) definition: 
Any segment sees itself as an independent unit in relation to another segment of the same section, but 
sees both segments as a unity in relation to another section; and a section which from the point of view 
of its members comprises opposed segments is  seen by members of other sections as an unsegmented 
unit [Evans-Pritchard 1974 I1 9401: 1471. 
We are all X in relation to Y, but X, in relation to X,; and from the viewpoint of Y’s members 
all of us are X, while from that of X l ’ s  we are all X,. Elements at the same level are formally 
equal and are defined by mutual contradistinction, that is, by balanced opposition. They are 
characteristically not defined in isolation or by reference to the set they fall in. 
To invoke inclusion or hierarchy one has to break with the rhetoric of collective identity and 
invoke that of ”leaders” (more properly “guarantors,” Dresch 1981 :8111984a:40,45) or break 
with tribal rhetoric altogether, as was continually done by Yemeni tribalism’s historical com- 
plement, the Zaydi Imamate (cf. Dresch 1981 :82, 1984b3164). Within tribal rhetoric one con- 
stantly encounters a model or “ideology” (above), much as was the case among the Nuer (Ev- 
ans-Pritchard 1974 [ I  9401: 144): the named elements of the classification are spoken of as act- 
ing in predictable ways. In practice things are less tidy. The names invoked in particular 
circumstances cannot always be guessed in advance and the classification is  not “realized” as 
a whole; but, whichever names are evoked, the structural principles just outlined still apply. 
That, perhaps, is to say no more than that tribalism still flourishes in Upper Yemen more than 
in most places. A more basic point is  at issue, though. The particular patterns of categories and 
the courses that events take are extremely variable, so that an empirical approach leaves us 
with a long list of separate oddities. The confusion is not resolved by a focus on individuals: 
the list of oddities simply grows longer. The obvious parallel (in method, be it said, not ethnog- 
raphy) is with something like the Indian caste system, where it i s  not useful even to ask how 
many elements of the system there are, where the specificity of each case cuts it off from the 
next in a neighboring village, but where a principle can nonetheless be found that is common 
to different instances (Dumont 1970). The principle to be found in the case of Middle Eastern 
tribalism is  balanced opposition. Since opposition occurs at more than one level, the formu- 
lation we require is that found in the notion of segmentation. 
the course of events 
The acid test of lineage theory (the “social masses” view of society) was what happened in 
conflict. It should by now be a commonplace that conflict and opposition are not the same 
thing (Pocock 1961 :72-79). Conflict is  only one type of event that may occur along the axis 
that a particular opposition forms, but conflict is what people in these societies themselves often 
dwell on and it provides an instructive case. In lineage theory there was supposed to be a 
“massing effect”: 
In any opposition lwhat i s  meant here is  surely conflict] between parties A and B, a l l  those more closely 
related to A than to 6 will stand with A against B, and vice versa. Segments are pitted against equivalent 
segments: any opposition between groups (or members thereof) expands automatically to opposition 
between the largest equivalent lineages of which the contestants are respectively members [Sahlins 
1961 :3321. 
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In the case at hand, this massing effect does not occur reliably; nor, indeed, does the segmen- 
tary structure allow one to predict particular events at all.s The implications drawn out in the 
above passage are, however, present and we must consider how they are dealt with. 
A distinction should first be made, to avoid confusion, between the sets of men that tribal 
names denote and the (transient) groups of men who act in those names and are acted on.lD 
The identity conditions of the sets and of the groups are surely different, and the two types of 
element are distinct in practice: for one thing, they are of different sizes. A war may be spoken 
of by those involved as being between two tribes, or even between Hashid and Bakil, but the 
men doing the fighting usually number dozens, and only seldom even hundreds, while the sets 
in whose names they fight comprise tens of thousands.” Most of those who fall within the two 
opposed sets will take little or no part. But even small-scale fighting exemplifies the opposition 
between the two tribes and hence demonstrates those tribes’ honor, which itself gives events 
their sense. The types of events are specified in part by the structure, but the course of events 
is not and may cross the tribal categories in almost any direction. 
Let us take a case. BaniSuraym and al-<Usaymat are both Hsshid tribes, while Sufyan i s  part 
of Bakil. A man from al-<Usaymat, who made a living from the transport of firewood by truck, 
was involved in an accident within Sufyan’s territory. Certain shaykhs of al-Wsaymat wrote to 
those of Sufyan demanding to know who was responsible. No satisfactory answer was received, 
and roadblocks were set up in al-‘Ugaymat’s territory to impound trucksfrom Sufyan. Men from 
Sufyan then set up roadblocks in their own territory and impounded trucks, not only from al- 
‘Usaymat, but also from BaniSuraym (both the latter are tjashidi). Roadblocks next appeared 
in Bani Suraym but the trucks impounded there were from al-‘Usaymi3t, whom the Suraymis 
held responsible for the dispute, and not from Sufyan: XI  at odds with Y, turned on X, which 
is not unusual. Note, though, that XI  and Y, did not combine against X, because there are no 
readily available terms in which to do so. One would have to shift register, as it were, and 
invoke a nontribal identity. 
Things got seriously out of hand when a Suraymi fired on an ‘Usaymi truck in which there 
happened to be women (a great “disgrace” or ”insult,” [ayb) and large numbers of al-‘Usaymat 
gathered for war. A delegation of shaykhs from elsewhere in Hashid intervened between al- 
‘Usaymat and BaniSuraym and arranged a truce. The dispute between members of al-Qaymat 
and Sufyan (potentially between Hashid and Bakil) was all but forgotten and was eventually 
settled between individual families. 
At the center of any wider dispute, then, are the particular antagonists-individuals or par- 
ticular families. Around them forms a pattern of pressures. What the pattern will be in a given 
case depends on any number of considerations besides ”clannishness,” and the pattern is  in 
part negotiable. Let us see how these negotiations might proceed. 
Two particular gestures-giving rifles and giving slaughter-beasts paqd’ir)-are employed in 
circumstances of appeasement, of forming pledges, and of demanding help.’* For example, if 
a man from one tribe kills a man from another, the killer’s people should immediately send the 
victim’s people a bull. If the bull is not given, then the victim’s people have little option but to 
seek revenge: insult has been added to injury, and the victim’s people are dishonored (“their 
faces are blackened,” suwwad wujddwrn). If a bull is  offered and accepted (which it may not 
be), the way is  open for settlement of the blood-debt by cash compensation. These protocols 
of appeasement may break down at any point. Nevertheless, they provide the possibility of 
settling a blood-debt peacefully, over whatever structural distance, between “the killer’s peo- 
ple” and “the victim’s people” (ah1 al-qdtil and ah/ a/-qatil). These terms are of indeterminate 
reference in Yemeni Arabic and are deliberately left vague in translation. 
If one man wounds another, the culprit’s people should offer the victim’s people a rifle: a 
“rifle of right or justice” (bunduq al-saw&) or a “rifle of patience” (bunduq al-sabr). If the rifle 
is offered and accepted (which, again, i t  may not be), then the victim’s people acquire right of 
judgment. They are honor-bound not to seek revenge while the rifle is  held, and they can, in 
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theory, name the amends due them. Again, the proceedings may break down at any point. If 
they do, then the rifle i s  handed back, as it i s  i f  negotiations are concluded satisfactorily. The 
link persists only as long as the token is retained, but the possibility exists of sustaining the link 
and concluding the matter peacefully. 
Even in cases of wounding, a slaughter-beast Paqirah, maqyad) often precedes or accom- 
panies cash compensation. In serious cases, the cash may be waived by the victim’s people but 
the slaughter-beasts cannot, and in al l  cases the protocols of appeasement are, in one form or 
another, needed. Without the beast or the token there is  no binding relation Palqah), but only 
a debt to be paid in blood. The beast or the rifle denies the insult, and it is the insult (not the 
injury itself) that besmirches honor. The seriousness of the offense is  identical with the extent 
to which honor is  besmirched (or “broken,” as the Yemenis say), and this i s  not simply given 
by the nature of the offense at the time it occurs but emerges in the period after it. 
The segmentary, tribal structure is  of honor, not of cohesive groups. Any two tribesmen will 
be at a certain structural distance from each other, and the two points they occupy in the clas- 
sification define an axis of opposition. If they happen to belong to different tribes, then the 
situation is  as shown in Figure 2.  
This is an abstract relation and a similar line can be drawn between any two men, whether 
or not they are at odds. If a conflict does arise between the two men in the diagram and one 
inflicts a loss on the other, then there i s  an implication that the honor of their respective villages, 
sections, and tribes is  at stake. The implication may be ignored, taken up, or denied, according 
to circumstance. If no recent antagonism has set the two tribes at odds, and if  the protocols of 
appeasement are now applied promptly, the two antagonists and their families may settle the 
matter without the issue of wider involvement ever being raised. If previous antagonism has, 
as it were, primed the system, or if the present dispute i s  not composed easily, then the abstract 
implication of wide involvement may be vigorously taken up. In the first case, “the victim’s 
people” are a tiny group, perhaps the man’s immediate kin. In the second case, “the victim’s 
people” may be his whole tribe. It is important to note that these different outcomes can derive 
from what, in our view of things, i s  the same offense.” 
The elements of the tribal system (hardly more than names for most purposes) are opposed 
to each other in terms of honor. The higher-order elements are more “significant” (more honor 
Figure 2. 
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is at stake, if you like) than those of lower orders: 
the rhetoric is ‘elevated‘ asone rises in the genealogy. For two neighboring lower lorderl segments may 
express their sharaf in feud, but the greater, more glorious sharaf of tribal segments must be expressed 
on a larger scale, that is, warfare [Meeker 1976, Pt. 1 :2551. 
This is not, of course, directly to do with numbers: a “war between Hashid and Bakil “may be 
highly significant in these terms, and remembered as such for decades, for all that the number 
of men who fought in it was tiny. The significance of the units invoked and the significance of 
the initial event leading to confrontation may also be linked. A dispute where honor i s  dra- 
matically at stake (one involving women, a protected person, a market, or some other marked 
element) tends to expand to fill the available space: that is, the dispute between A of Hashid 
and B of Bakil, for example, is  more likely to become ”a dispute between Hashid and Bakil.” 
On the other hand, if a dispute between A and B i s  characterized for other reasons as being 
between Hashid and Bakil (if antagonism already exists, or if public opinion is  manipulated for 
their own ends by some of those involved) then the dispute itself becomes more serious: the 
amends sought are higher and the settlement is more difficult.” 
Negotiation can also determine not only how much honor is  at stake but whose-not only 
how wide the circles invoked on our diagram (Figure 21, but which segments and arcs. If a man 
from Khiyar in Bani$raym (a Hashid tribe) i s  killed by a man from‘lyil %Abdillah in Arhab (a 
Bakil tribe), his immediate kin may at once take up arms. If there has been a recent antagonism 
along a closely parallel axis, then a wider confrontation may ensue at once, with others from 
‘lyal [Abdillah and Khiyar involved, or roadblocks being thrown up elsewhere in Bani&raym 
to trap anyone from Arhab, or fighting even breaking out along the common border of two other 
tribes, one from Hashid and one from Bakil. The numbers actively committed may remain 
small, but the spread of involvement can be very wide. More usually, though, events spread 
slowly. Khiyar may seek help from other sections of Bani$raym (from Wada‘ah, Bani Malik, 
and so on) at a specially convened meeting or at market on market day. The shaykhs of Khiyar 
might proffer the shaykhs of these other sections rifles, called “rifles of obligation” (banadiq al- 
talzim) or “rifles of brotherhood” (banddiq al-ikhd’). If such tokens are accepted, then for as 
long as they are held they denote a relation talqah) considered binding in a way that simply 
sharing an eponym is not. To impose a binding obligation more pressingly the shaykhs of Khiyar 
might kill a bull at market or at a meeting of the tribe or at the door of a particular shaykh whose 
help they wanted. 
A rifle can be handed back at any point, thus severing the link, and the obligation imposed 
by the slaughter of a bull can be lifted by returning and slaughtering a beast of about the same 
value (Serjeant 1977:245). There is  nothing predetermined about the outcome. The men of 
each section (or usually their more prominent shaykhs) can decide as they see fit. On the killer’s 
side (in ‘lyal <Abdillah ofA$ab in Bakil) a similar process of canvassing and giving or refusing 
support takes place, producing as irregular a pattern as on the victim’s side (in Khiyar of Bani 
Suraym in Hashid). 
The killer’s people may send the victim’s people a bull, opening negotiations for settlement 
and cutting short the search for allies on both sides. The victim’s people, on the other hand, 
may pass a rifle, called bunduq aParcj, to the shaykh of the killer’s own section or tribe. If this 
is  accepted by the shaykhs of Arhab, then they accept that ‘lyal <Abdillah are in the wrong and 
undertake to bring pressure on them; if it is  accepted by those of ‘lyal ‘Abdillah, they accept 
that their own man (the killer) is  wrong, and they undertake to chase him up (yuhawwir-hu) on 
hehalf of his structurally distant antagonists. The axis of dispute becomes the axis of settlement. 
If a dispute expands, for whatever reason, then men may find themselves involved, whether 
or not they wish it, because of the structural implications linking them with those principally at 
odds. The victim’s people in Bani$raym may, for instance, impound trucks not only from ‘ l yd  
cAbdillah (the killer’s particular section), but from men who belong to other sections of Arhab 
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(Bani <Ah, for instance) or even from men who belong to other tribes of Bakil, such as Sufyan. 
Bani ‘Ah, or whoever it may be, find themselves vulnerable through no direct action of their 
own. They are free, however, to opt out and deny any part in the widening antagonism by giving 
the shaykhs of Khiyar “rifles which clear them” (banadiq al-safw). If the rifles are accepted, a 
link is  formed. Bani‘AIi undertake not to support‘lyd rAbdiIlah in the dispute at hand and they 
cease to be liable to attack by those who hold the rifles. The same denials may be made on the 
victim’s side so that, as the dispute widens, certain sections of BaniSuraym, and beyond that 
certain tribes of Hashid, may stand aside by giving rifles to ‘lyd <AbdiIlah or to Arhab. The rifles 
may not be accepted. So long as the rifles are held the situation i s  redefined. 
The exchanges of bulls and rifles touched on so far may themselves be challenged. Members 
of one section may give a rifle (perhaps ”of companionship” or “of brotherhood”) to members 
of a second section, and the members of a third section may then proffer further rifles to claim, 
in effect, that the first rifle was accepted wrongly and should now be handed back to sever the 
relation. Negotiations may be a complex tangle of bids and counterbids from several parties. 
The complexity is  increased by the possibility of redefining what the last move meant: for ex- 
ample, a rifle that was given “for ‘a$(to have men intervene with their fellows on our behalf)” 
may come to be spoken of as “for right,” giving those who accepted it-now tacitly redefined 
as both our particular antagonists and their fellows-right of judgment and assuring us that they 
will not attack us. These alignments are necessarily arrived at by individuals, acting as guar- 
antors (dumana’, kufala’), who form specific ties with those they speak for and with each other, 
again exchanging rifles as tokens. 
Such ties cut across the explicit categories of tribal classification in several directions. The 
course events take does so too. The “massing effect,” whereby a conflict between individuals 
should actively involve all the members of the largest opposed sets they fall in, does not occur 
reliably. Parts of those sets and their subsets may be excluded explicitly. Others may simply not 
be involved. As we saw at the outset, members of X, at odds with Y ,  may set on X,. Lineage 
theory is contradicted by the course events take at one turn after another, and from that theory’s 
point of view all appears confusion. What are we left with? 
structure and action 
Groups may form or combine in a great many patterns other than those tribal classification 
suggests to us. Exchanges of bulls and rifles can result in a particular (abstract) opposition pro- 
viding the axis for conflict, alliance, or downright indifference. However, onedoes not just give 
rifles to anyone. Rifles of “brotherhood” are given precisely to one‘s “brothers,“ as the seg- 
mentary system defines them, to demand support from them or to pledge support; one gives 
rifles of <ard to one’s antagonist’s “brothers,” again as defined by the system, to have them 
bring pressure on him to make amends; outsiders are given rifles which clear one, precisely 
because of a man’s implication in the actions of his “brothers,” whom the structure defines. 
Without the structure al l  of these different actions would, strictly speaking, be meaningless. 
They would no more be action than is Brownian motion or the way the wind blows. The struc- 
ture that action presupposes is  not itself negotiated. The categories it informs are there before 
a sequence of events begins, and, whatever course events take, their significance derives in 
large part from the structure. 
How is  this connection to be understood? The original formulation of the idea of segmenta- 
tion was certainly concerned with political practice-it was intended to make that practice 
intelligible-but it was not a summary of political events or relations as such: 
political relations . . . are best stated as tendencies to conform to certain values in certain situations, and 
the value is determined by the structural relationships of the persons who compose the situation [Evans- 
Pritchard 1974 [19401:1371. 
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This is not a causal model that tells one reliably what will happen next.15 People do not behave, 
they act (Dumont 1970:6), and the approach in terms of segmentation characterizes the forms 
of action available. To do this it breaks down what in practice i s  a simultaneity. If we begin, in 
a fairly stable system, with observing political events, then political relations (which those 
events exemplify) precede them logically, values (as Evans-Pritchard notes here) are prior to 
political relations, structural relationships precede them, and complementary or balanced op- 
position, which specifies the form of those structural relationships, precedes or underlies the 
whole sequence.Ib 
To equate complementary opposition with “a pattern of loyalty and alliance,” as Salzman 
(1 978:53) and most authors do, is to collapse the argument and to miss its worth. Segmentation 
i s  then reduced to a summary of empirical observations. Either it is  a statistical gloss on a body 
of measurable events or a mechanical model of how these events are caused. In either case we 
find ourselves dealing again with behavior rather than with action: that is, with human events 
stripped of the values by which they were constituted in the first place. Such a reading is not, I 
think, true to the original (other readers will have their own view of Evans-Pritchard), and cer- 
tainly it is  unsatisfactory as a means of approaching ethnography. Collapsing the argument to 
produce empiricism (if that term be excused for brevity) is  what lineage theory did. 
The lesson of postwar ethnography elsewhere in the world is  surely that ”structure” is  not to 
be looked for in only one empirical instance. Instead, a purely formal relation (in this case, 
balanced opposition) i s  looked for that is  congruent with a number of often partial and informal 
local descriptions. The same principle might then appear in the ordering of categories or of 
groups, in what people do on one occasion and say on another, in the large scale settings of 
whole tribes or on the smaller scale of families and individuals. The point is  to isolate the form 
of such ties, regardless of the elements they join in different cases, and thus to isolate the con- 
ditions for their making sense to those involved. The most promising line, therefore, is  to ask 
not why specific events take the course they do, but rather what sorts of events are possible- 
to look not at actors or groups, but at forms of action. Eickelman makes a similar point as fol- 
lows: 
The relatively stable element in this type of social structure is  not the patterning of relations between 
persons or groups of persons, as is suggested by many definitions of social structure. Rather, it is the 
culturally accepted means by which persons contract and maintain dyadic bonds and obligations with 
one another IEickelman 1976:901. 
All that needs to be added is  that these “means” are themselves an expression of structure, just 
as transient relations are, and that whether or not these relations are between persons or groups, 
or for that matter between sets, becomes secondary. 
Groups, of course, emerge from interaction: little knots of men one could count and observe. 
There is no need, though, to mistake the groups for the sets in whose names they act. Both 
demonstrate segmentation, but neither can be equated with the structure itself. The temptation 
to downgrade segmentation to the status of “ideology” derives from identifying the structure 
with one of its instances-with a set of explicit categories, for instance, or with an alignment 
of groups at a given time. The “refutation” of segmentation can then only take the form of the 
complaint, in the anthropology of another area and an earlier period, that marriage circles do 
not always close. 
The complaint is, of course, entirely justified if by structure one means “actually existing 
relations” that are supposedly ”observable” (Radcliffe-Brown 1965:190). Moroccan tribalism 
is dealt with by Eickelman very soundly in those terms. He documents the lack of fit between 
events and the tribal classification, much as one might do for Yemen, shows how a colonial 
administration “froze” tribes into more stable divisions than they had been, and stresses the 
incomplete knowledge of those divisions most tribesmen have. He concludes that 
social structure in Morocco, both urban and tribalrural, is based upon the ordered relationships not of 
groups of persons, but of persons . . . Tribes, tribal sections, local communities, quarters, agnatic descent 
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and so on merely constitute frameworks by means of which persons relate to each other [Eickelman 
1976:1201. 
This is surely true, given a certain view of what social structure must be. However, the result is 
just as surely a blockage. After all, so much of Moroccan history consists of tribes (these “frame- 
works” of relation) displacing one another in spectacular fashion (see, for example, Dunn 
1973), and we would have no means to describe this. Even the local system Eickelman himself 
is discussing becomes very hard to deal with. We are told, for example, that “sections” (the 
next level down from ”tribes”) were fairly long-lived identities and “fulfilled defensive func- 
tions” in the building of forts (Eickelman 1976:113), which is  unusual enough in the context 
of Middle Eastern tribalism for one to want to know more. But the tribes of the Tadla plain slip 
from view as arbitrarily as they came, and with them the whole phenomenon of tribalism. 
The stress on individual actors was welcomed as a reaction to the excesses of lineage theory. 
Where tribes and sections were depicted as solidary masses that pushed and pulled in predict- 
able fashion, individuals could only be automata. The reaction, however, leaves us at the other 
extreme, where there are only individuals, and vertiginously free ones at that. What sorts of 
actions are then available to them (let alone compelling for them) that are not so for all of us? 
From the point of view of people within the system, or indeed of those analyzing it from 
outside, the tribal divisions may appear as something like a “framework” (Eickelman 
1976:120; Rosen 1979:25), but the relation of action to the notion of segmentation is  more 
intimate than this image suggests. The actor himself (the tribesman) is  constituted by the pos- 
session of honor, which itself, as we have seen, is  a segmentary quality.” He is  not just a point, 
with position but no cultural extent, around which meaning coalesces. Far from being given, 
the actor is  constituted in accord with the same structural principle as the categories with which 
he works and the forms of action available to him. People may alter their place in the set of 
categories, but they cannot be without a place. To be a tribesman is to be part of a set opposed 
to other sets. If the opposition i s  expressed at some point as conflict, then one has various op- 
tions, as we have seen, but each option is  itself informed by the notion of segmentation, just as 
i s  the event that requires that one choose between options in the first place. 
Furthermore, actions are meaningful in something more than the sense of being glossed (by 
the actor or others) ex post facto. The intent of the action is  integral to it and itself i s  informed 
by the notion of segmentation. It is  not the case, for example, that a man’s arm is  extended with 
a rifle in his hand that is grasped by another man whom the analyst then discerns as part of a 
set related somehow to that which the first man falls in. One “gives a rifle of patience.” That 
itself is the action. The identities of the giver and receiver are inseparably part of its intent, and 
their (structural) relation is  informed by opposition. Without this there would be no action, but 
only a physical event. If the meaning of the first act is changed (the rifle’s significance is  rede- 
fined, which itself i s  an action), then the same argument applies to the change as to the initial 
gesture. 
Isolating the actor as a key to analysis leaves society as a residue to be built up by the actors’ 
efforts. Social structure, in rather Radcliffe-Brown’s sense, then appears to be accounted for by 
observing these actors, while meaning (or perhaps culture) provides the terms in which actors 
operate. The alert writer using this paradigm is soon forced to speak of conceptual and rela- 
tional planes that are somehow distinct (for example, Rosen 1979:27). The actor, robbed of 
either kind of attribute, i s  supposed somehow to combine these, and “action” becomes a loose 
metaphor for the process of combination. The problem is that the relational plane is not only 
conceptualized but works through concepts, and the concepts have no sense without relations. 
Meaning permeates both levels.’” The problem i s  at its most acute where individuals act, not 
simply against each other (taking others on one by one in dyadic relations), but with reference 
to terms that denote collectivities: men gather, for instance, in response to a tribal name. One 
cannot describe this in dyadic terms unless one poleof each dyad is  the nonexistent “ancestor” 
of the tribe. 
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problems of change 
Rosen, though also stressing individuals and their weblike networks, draws attention to a 
further problem that arises with the same view of social structure as that used by Eickelman. 
Two tribes, the Ait Yussi (whose explicit divisions usually “provide a framework, . . . a lexicon 
of possible affiliations upon which individuals can draw in forming their personal networks” 
(Rosen 1979:25) and the Ait Seghoushen (presumably similar), fell out over the activities of a 
third tribe who may have settled in the area under the aegis of Ait Yussi but in the course of the 
dispute now claimed to be Ait Seghoushen (Rosen 1979:53-57). The importance of tribal iden- 
tity is  here not in doubt at all, but the identities, perhaps not very clear to start with, change. 
Let us say that clyal cAbdillah of Amab (Bakil) come off worse in their encounter with Khiyar 
of BaniSuraym (Hashid). They appeal for support to the other sections of Amab and little help 
is forthcoming. Their last resort is to cease to be Amabi. If the rest of Bakil provides no satisfac- 
tion, they may cease to be Bakili. They then go to a Hashid tribe (usually one goes to the neigh- 
boring tribe, which in this case would be Khlrif) and they proffer bulls to be slaughtered in the 
Hashid tribe’s market. If the bulls are accepted, then ‘lyal [Abdillah “become brother” (yu- 
khawlj) to Hashid, and become in fact part of the tribe who accept their bulls. Amab should 
come after them and slaughter further bulls to revoke this redefinition, but changes do some- 
times occur that are not revoked.” 
One could not say, as Rosen says of the Moroccan case, that ”As a vehicle for gaining allies, 
there was no compunction on anyone‘s part about claiming alternative and mutually contra- 
dictory tribal identities” (Rosen 1979:56). Such changes are not undertaken lightly (one can 
too easily fall between two stools and have no allies). But more important for the present pur- 
pose is the analytical point that the identities themselves are not contradictory, only the claims: 
the concepts or categories themselves are not negotiable, but only who or what falls in which 
of them. The categories and the structure preexist the actions. A new set of actions (a pattern 
of alliance) that does contradict the original categories becomes possible only with explicit 
redefinition. 
The larger system of categories remains intact: Hashid remains opposed to Bakil, and Bani 
Suraym or Kharif to Amab. Only an element of one set i s  reassigned to another set. Furthermore, 
even if we focus on explicit changes at the level redefinition takes place, the structural principle 
that informs the new disposition is  the same as that informing the old-balanced opposition. 
One tribe is opposed to the other, though a section that was part of the first is now part of the 
second. The “concept of genealogical relatedness” (which specifies identity in a tribe and sit- 
uates sections or tribes with respect to each other in accord with the notion of segmentation) is 
not “an inherently malleable basis for conceptualizing and rationalizing a network that will 
have been built up through a number of dyadic bonds” (Rosen 1979:105). It is  the logical and 
cultural ground for such bonds to be formed, severed, or even recognized. It is  all that gives the 
change its meaning. A section severs its definitional ties with a tribe because its members feel 
themselves wronged. The honor of a tribe requires that “brothers” uphold each other’s claims 
to right and the right of the tribe itself. The honor of the tribe that a section leaves i s  thus called 
into question and the honor of the tribe it joins is affirmed before others, hence the moral im- 
perative (usually felt in practice) for the first tribe to retrieve its seceding section. 
We said earlier that from the point of view of behavior or observation almost anything could 
happen, while from that of action and meaning one seldom escaped the notion of segmenta- 
tion. This i s  a case in point. We said also that there is  a “tendency” for events to follow the 
lines of tribal classification. If one wanted a measure of that tendency, then it would have to be 
the number of times that different men of X (however many or few) combined against different 
men of Y, as compared with combinations of men from X and Y against other men from X.  The 
ratio does not have to be large for us to discern a “segmentary operator.’’zL1 Think then about 
what the denominator of our fraction would be. If men of X and Y combine against other men 
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from X, in what terms would they do so! Not segmentary terms, plainly, because there is  no 
identity in the system shared by some members of X and some of Y, but not by others.” Where 
the categories are unavoidably put to the test (which seldom happens) and are found wanting, 
they are reordered and the identities redefined. The apparently arbitrary course of events, as 
measured by the observer’s categories, is  evidence against lineage theory. The fact that a 
change is  made in the tribesmen’s categories is  an equally striking demonstration of segmen- 
tation’s importance. 
The Yemeni examples touched on earlier show that the “massing effect” does not occur 
reliably: not al l  of those closer to A than to B support A, nor all of those closer to B support B. 
The converse principle, however, that of “segmental limitation” (Bohannan 1958:50), re- 
mained intact: even if not all of those closer to A or B become involved, at least no one is  
involved beyond the smallest set that contains A and B together. From a certain point of view, 
this principle can also be contravened in practice. When this happens, the categories of the 
tribal system must be consciously altered. 
Let us say that ‘lyal <Abdillah and Bani‘Ali (both of them from Amah) fall out with each other 
and no other tribe i s  involved at all. It may be that ‘lyal LAbdiIlah, despairing of their claim 
being settled, “become brother” to the neighboring Hashid tribe of Kharif. If the original squab- 
ble is not halted, ‘lyal <AbdiIIah now have a claim (and a very strong one) to support from Kharif. 
Bani ‘A I i  have a claim on Arhab. The two tribes of Kharif and A$ab may be set at odds, and 
behind them lie al l  of Hashid on the one hand and Bakil on the other. In other words, a conflict 
between Y, and Y, may provoke a conflict between Y and X; but i t  can do so precisely because 
those terms have been shifted in an ordered manner. 
Again, all of this can only make sense in terms of a certain concept of honor, a certain type 
of relation that is  described as balanced opposition. The elements may shift position but the 
type of relation between them is always the same: formally equal elements are defined by con- 
tradistinction, and formal inequality i s  admissible only in terms of the inclusion of subsets in 
larger sets. The problems of analysis have little to do with the distinction between individuals 
and groups. They have a great deal to do with that between specific ties and general principles. 
Indeed, it i s  only by abstracting the general principles that we can describe the forms of change. 
conclusion 
I have touched at a number of points on writings about Morocco, and have myself used 
material from Yemen. North Africa and South Arabia are in some respects different. The Yemeni 
tribal system i s  characterized by remarkable geographical stability over long periods, for in- 
stance, while the Moroccan system exhibits as remarkable a degree of change (this makes the 
problems touched on here more pressing in the Moroccan case, not less so).L2 In many other 
respects, the differences are not so marked. In both cases one cannot successfully deal in terms 
of solidary groups. In both, the replacement of specific links between groups by links between 
individuals seems problematic. 
No one would claim (except perhaps Gellner 1969:42) that segmentation was by any means 
the only principle at work in tribal society; no one would claim that the interpretive position 
contained only the stress on persons dealt with here. Yet a certain link with past thought seems 
missing. The approach shared by Eickelman, Rosen, Geertz, and others (Eickelman 1984:285) 
did not rise fully formed from a world bereft of previous anthropology, and the resources avail- 
able are perhaps richer than at first appears. Segmentary lineage theory has to go, but to reject 
the notion of segmentation along with it seems retrograde. Far from being incompatible with 
an interpretive position, and thus due to be superseded, it provides an essential aid to the proj- 
ect of delineating “the implicit assumptions which people themselves make” (Eickelman 
1984:286). To reject it is, in effect, to reject part of those assumptions, the part that constitutes 
tribalism as any more than the lack of urban civility. 
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An earlier version of this paper was read at University of California-Santa Barbara and at Michigan in 
March 1984. Walter Edwards, Bruce Mannheim, Sherry Ortner, and Andrew Shryock were all kind enough 
to read and comment on a more recent draft. I am particularly grateful to Dave Edwards for his detailed 
suggestions. The faults remain my own. 
'See particularly Gellner (1969:44), but the essential elements of this reading are already apparent in 
Middleton and Tait (1958), including the characterization of solidary groups as "corporate." This is not the 
place to pursue the question. However, Evans-Pritchard and Fortes are still often spoken of in the same 
breath (for example, Salzman 1978:54); it is a useful exercise to follow the term "corporate" through the 
Tallensi books and then search it out in the Nuer trilogy. They are very different. 
As far as the Middle East i s  concerned, the joker in the pack is Peters' paper ( 1  967), which no other work 
on the subject fails to mention, but which itself nowhere names the object of its criticism. Much of the 
argument therefore turns on a "virtual image," a byproduct of Peters' own position. 
*There is one place, and I think one place only, in the book where balanced opposition and political 
equilibrium are equated (Evans-Pritchard 1974 [1940]:130, where "balanced hostility" and "equilibrium 
of opposition" are in apposition). The "people with few cattle" are being discussed, that is, those who 
cannot readily be beaten (organized Shilluk) or are not worth beating (tsetse-ridden Anuak). It is not that 
the Nuer push and these other people push back with equal force, but that force is seldom exerted at all. 
'A similar point i s  made by Salzman (1979:123), who realizes that "lineages" are not an essential part 
even of lineage theory. His own analysis, however, continues to pursue "corporateness" ( 1  979: 122,1978). 
In fact corporateness in the strict sense is  usually absent from Middle Eastern societies; its presence would 
always need to be established in a given case. If there really were corporate groups, then the idea of seg- 
mentation would not be so necessary in the first place (cf. Sahlins 1961 :329). 
"Eickelman ( 1  984:286) complains of misplaced criticism that depicts the interpretive approach as con- 
cerned "merely" with dyadic networks and the like. Certainly there is more to the approach than that. 
However, the stress on persons and dyads is an impassably salient part of the project as formulated so far. 
5For further information on the Yemeni tribal system north of San'i', see Dresch 1984a and 1984b. For 
a more general sketch of the elements of Yemeni society, see Serjeant 1977. By tribe I translate qabilah, 
which may admittedly be used on occasion of much smaller units but which usually refers to one of the 
twenty or so major elements. Some of these are very large. It would not be unusual to refer to Khawlan al- 
Tiyd as a "tribe" that itself contains several "tribes." 
bSee Meeker's very useful discussion of the problem (1976) and compare the present diagram with that 
which Meeker provides (1976, Pt. 1 :255). 
'For an outline of these different groups and instances see Rossi (1939:141-143), Serjeant (19771, and 
Dresch (1981 :85, n. 15).  
"A rhetoric of moral equilibrium is not, of course, the same thing as political equilibrium. At the same 
time it i s  a feature of Arab tribalism that explicit categories are rather seldom destroyed, no matter what 
displacement or diminution their members suffer: "the fate of Bajila i s  a marvel, not the norm" (Crone 
1980:23). The Berber case may very well be different. 
The cultural presumption of formal "balance" is evident in several linguistic symmetries; for example, 
'ayb i s  both the "insult" committed by an offender and the "disgrace" his victim suffers, ghardmah i s  both 
the "crime" of inflicting damage and the "cost" of amends. Note also "the killer's people" and "the vic- 
tim's people" below. 
9Sahlin~ is quoted here for the succinctness of his formulations. The theory of which they form part would 
certainly not apply to the Yemeni case. 
"'Evans-Pritchard uses the principle of opposition, says Dumont, but "he expresses it for the most part 
in the language of oppositions of fact, of conflict. In this sense his structure generally appears as tied to 
empirical circumstances" (Dumont 1970:4142).  Some of his key formulations are very likely to mislead: 
for example, "by social structure we mean relations between groups which have a high degree of consis- 
tency and constancy" (Evans-Pritchard 1974 I 1  9401 :262). The distinction between sets and groups has the 
virtue of clarifying Evans-Pritchard's own distinction between tribes and their members, but it is only useful 
on condition that the (comparatively stable) alignments of the sets not be identified, any more than the 
(comparatively unstable) alignments of groups, with the structure itself. 
"By far the most serious clash I witnessed ( 1  978) "between Hashid and Bakil" involved about two thou- 
sand men on each side, dug in and facing each other on a common border. This was spoken of as one of 
the largest turnouts since the end of the civil war in 1970, but represents less than 10 percent of the adult 
male population. 
'>In what follows, only an outline is given of the means by which alliances are formed or repudiated. A 
fuller account will appear in a book-length treatment of the ethnography, which is  now in progress. 
"An analysis of social structure by way of hypothetical questions about solidarity in cases of vengeance, 
which one still finds fieldworkers attempting, therefore works very poorly in this case. Tribesmen are well 
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aware of the variability, and the more alert of them are quite clear that they can develop or constrain the 
spread of involvement. The different "rules" one elicits for the division of blood-money indicate where the 
ambiguities lie. 
I4These differences are typically spoken of in terms of the importance of the arbitrators whom the case 
involves, and the penalties due for breaking the truce that these arbitrators impose. The importance of the 
arbitrators, usually shaykhs, and of the dispute are two sides of the same coin. For a brief sketch of arbitra- 
tion see Dresch 1984a:3942. 
lslmmediately after the famous block diagram of A, B, X, Y, XI and X, (Evans-Pritchard 1974 I1 9401 :144), 
comes a detailed account of some actual disputes among the Nuer that do not follow the simple pattern 
that the diagram suggests. Had Evans-Pritchard been concerned with a causal model, as so many subse- 
quent writers assume he was, he would surely have felt obliged to account for this oddity. He seems to 
have been concerned with how events are to be characterized, not predicted. 
IbLet me stress that logical precedence is not the same as temporal order. In fact, in a system of this kind, 
almost any political event is going to be taken as exemplifying an existing relation, hence (among other 
things) the very common appearance of disputes as indefinitely old. The exception will be discussed below 
("Problems of change"). 
I7lt is  worth stressing this pointclearly. "The tribesman regards himself as the possessor of a quality called 
sharaf or honour, but the most important constituent of that honour seems to be the tradition of bearing 
arms and being capable of defending oneself and one's dependents"-those "lacking" this quality are by 
definition not tribesmen (Serjeant 1977:227). 
9 t  i s  symptomatic that Rosen (1979:27, 106, n. 6) sees Meeker's paper as arguing for a "conceptual 
order . . , almost wholly divorced from the social order." One of the merits of Meeker's paper (1 976) is 
that, among the grand themes that perhaps irritate some readers, it deals with that most pedestrian of an- 
thropology's topics-marriage ties and kinship. How "relational" can one get? 
I9Again I must apologize to the reader and postpone a detailed treatment to the book-length account. 
However, changes of alignment by "brotherhood" are a well-established featureof Yemeni tribalism, men- 
tioned as early as the 10th century A.D. (see, for example, Hamdani 1948:28, 56, and passim). A very 
famous case at the turn of the present century involved the village of al-Matrad, on the border of'lyil Surayh 
and Bani Suraym. 
'"The parallel, of course, i s  with Levi-Straw's "matrilateral operator" (Levi-Strauss 1969:xxxiii). The 
interesting point, and the one over which Levi-Strauss parted company with Needham (Levi-Strauss 
1969:xxxii, xxxv), is that the same structural principle that shows up in the observer's (statistical) model 
also shows up in the local (mechanical) model of society and in many of that society's partial representa- 
tions. It i s  the local model, not ours, that provides the grounds for action. 
210ne could take a stand here and insist that there are no negative instances that "disprove" the notion 
of segmentation, only instances that illustrate other notions. But in practice, instances that run counter to 
the "rules" (as deployed in the particular case) are registered as doing so and their significance thus derives 
quite directly from the same categories as does that of instances that conform to the rules. 
22Because of the longevity of particular tribal categories, one can use the image of a "framework' for 
many purposes in the Yemeni case in a way one cannot in the Moroccan. For many other purposes, as we 
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